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OPERATION "ICEBERG" Page 4.
(Enclosure No. II to V.L.B.P.F. No. 1092/4 of 9th May, 1945,
NARRATIVE (Contd)
…
April 1st
A.C.1. assumed tactical command, H.M. Ships ARGONAUT and WAGER opened out to their picket positions before the fighter sweep was sent in at 0640 from a flying-off position 23° 26' N 125° 25' E.
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OPERATION "ICEBERG" Page 5.
(Enclosure No. II to V.L.B.P.F. No. 1092/4 of 9th May, 1945,
NARRATIVE (Contd)
At 0650 bogies were detected by radar 75 miles to the westward, height 8,000 feet, closing at 210 knots. The fighter sweep was recalled to intercept and additional fighters were flown off.
Raid Intercepted
The raid split up more than 40 miles from the Fleet. The first interception was by Corsairs from H.M.S. VICTORIOUS which shot down one enemy. Seafires shot down two more close to the fleet and a fourth was destroyed by Hellcats recalled from the fighter sweep. At 0705 the Fleet had been alerted to "Flash Red," and a few minutes later the enemy planes commenced their attacks.
INDOMITABLE machine gunned
One enemy single-engined aircraft machine-gunned HMS INDOMITABLE in a low attack killing one rating and wounding two officers and four ratings. Still flying very low it made a similar attack on H.M.S. KING GEORGE V but without causing casualties. Considerable difficulty was. experienced in identifying enemy from our own planes who were hard on the enemy heels.
INDEFATIGABLE crashed by suicide
At 0727 an enemy plane dived into the base of H.M.S. INDEFATIGABLE's Island. Four officers and ten ratings were killed, and sixteen of her complement wounded. The Flight Dock was put temporarily out of action, but within a remarkably short time, and in a most creditable manner, aircraft were again being operated from this ship although that day on a reduced scale.
ULSTER bombed taken in tow by GAMBIA
At about 0755 S. ULSTER was near missed by what appeared to be a 500lb. bomb from an aircraft then being chased by one of our fighters. Sho reported that the bulkhead between the engineroom and the after boiler-room had blown, flooding both compartments, but that the ship was floating well. Casualties were two killed and one seriously wounded. She was unable to steam but her armament remained effective. H.M.A.S. QUIBERON was ordered to stand by her and as soon as the raid was over H.M.N.Z.S. GAMBIA was ordered to tow her to Leyte.
Bombing strike
At 1215 a bombing strike was sent in against ISHIGAKI to bomb airfields and runways. No activity was noted. At 1430 reports were received from combat patrols over the islands that more aircraft had been sighted at HIRARA and ISHIGAKI airfields. Those were attacked by the fighter patrols and were followed by a fighter sweep. It was estimated that about 14 enemy aircraft were destroyed on the ground during this attack and others damaged.
Air Attack on Fleet
At 1730 a low flying bogey was detected by radar at a range of 15 miles to the north westward. Hellcats wero sent to intercept this raid which developed into 2 plus but the enemy avoided them in cloud. Soon afterwards the Fleet sighted the enemy and opened fire, somotimos, it is regretted, at friendly fighters. One enemy aircraft dived on H.M.S. VICTORIOUS; her swing undor full helm was successful and the plane touched its wing only on the flight deck edge, spinning harmlessly into the sea whore its bomb exploded clear of the ship. The manuscript instructions to the pilot were blown on board H.M.S. VICTORIOUS; this interesting document denoting priority of targets for suicide planes, has been translated and the contents forwarded to intelligence centre. It seems certain that VICTORIOUS's guns hit this aircraft during its dive.
This matter of differentiating between our own aircraft and the enemy becomes daily of more importence. With the suicide attack and, as is inevitable, with our own fighters pursuing the enemy right on to the Fleet's
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OPERATION "ICEBERG" Page 6.
(Enclosure No. II to V.L.B.P.F. No. 1092/4 of 9th May, 1945,
NARRATIVE (Contd)
guns there is only a matter of seconds in which to act. Presented at certain angles there is very little difference between the suicide equipped Japanese single-engined aircraft and some of our own fighters. On the other hand the means of controlling, particularly of stopping the fire of the innumerable small guns that are now scattered about ships, often with poor communications, makes the problem difficult.
I feel that means for rapid and immediate identification must be introduced; as long as we are depending on eye shooting and often on not very experienced gunners the identification must be visual and not, in so far as the personnel at the guns are concerned, by some complicated or delicate instrument. I suggest this as a matter on which our best brains should be set to work for the issues involved can be very serious.
Commodoro Oarne, H.M.S. STRIKER, has been asked to get down to this problem - i.e., a means of recognising our own fighters when close in.
At dusk the Fleet disengaged to the south eastward and CTF 57 assumed tactical command.