SECRET
Office of the Vice Admiral
Second in Command
British Pacific Fleet.
V.A.B.P.F. No. 1092/4
11th May, 1945.
British Admiralty Delegation,
Washington.
Two copies of V.A.B.P.F. No. 1092/4 of 9th May, giving a brief summary of Task Force 57's activities during the initial stages of operation ICEBERG for the period 23rd March to 23rd April inclusive, are forwarded for information.
VICE ADMIRAL
Encl.
Two copies of V.A.B.P.F. No. 1092/1 of 9th May.
(without enclosures)
SECRET
Office of the Vice Admiral,
Second-in-Cammand,
British Pacific Fleet.
V.A.B.P.F. No. 1092/4
9th May, 1945.
Sir,
I have the honour to forward for your information reports of proceedings from the ships of the British Pacific Fleet which participated in the initial stages of Operation ICEBERG for the period from March 26th until April 20th, together with a general narrative of events for this period. This latter duplicates inevitably many of the events and remarks made in the enclosures but is designed to present an overall and brief picture.
2. The successful capture of OKINAWA, as a stepping stone on the way to the overthrow of the Japanese Empire was appreciated as of paramount importance, and it was in consequence a matter of great satisfaction to all in the two Forces, 57 and 112, that the former was able, in however small a degree, to draw a little of the enemy fire from those American Forces destined to bear the brunt of the attock in those initiol stagos of the operation. It is hoped that, by their efforts in this area, any major staging of Japanese aircraft to the critical scene of operations was impeded. The resources of the Rear Admiral, Fleet Train Task Force 112, on which we depend for logistical support, are in some matters still somewhat embryonic: I have reason to believe that he stretched them considerably to keep my force operating.
3. Although the period under review was quiet and the enemy hard to find, those attacks which did develop gave us valuable experience and revealed several flaws in our organisation which diligence, time and additional resources will remedy. Accurate assessments of the damage inflicted by our strikes were often difficult to determine: this was in part due to the enemy's skilful use of dummy aircraft, and dispersal.
4 The lack of night circraft to watch the enemy airfields at night or when dusk and night shodowing took place, the unsuitability of Seafiro circroft, and the strain on fighter pilots which becomes apparent during the later stages of the operation will all have to be considered when planning future operations of this or similar nature. Without spare pilots, to take on one aspect only, it is considered that a three-day operational strike period is excessive.
5. The difficulty of aircrew recognition when friendly and enemy planes are in the vicinity of the fleet is an over-pressing problem: several proposals to obviate this confusion have been discussed, and, as recorded in the narrative, a solution to this appears of first importance. I trust we shall find one.
6. The attack by a suicide aircraft on the fleet demonstrates once again the importance of fighter interception being carried out at the maximum possible range. In the case of high and modium threats, the fighters usually have sufficient opportunity of operating well clear of the Fleet, but we have as yot no satisfrotory solution in the case of low flying attacks which are first detected at 20 to 25 miles, Once the fighter melee hos closod to within 10 miles, radar screens become soturated and diroction of fighters and target indication by radar methods tend completely to break down; the flying off of additional fighters under those conditions only confuses the issue. Detection of enemy aircraft was, on the whole, very satisfactory and the fighter direction officers on most occasions to allow interceptions to be made some distance from the Fleet.
7. It has been unusual, during my generation, for a British Fleet of this size to remain at sea for the length of time covered by this report, and I had before found myself wondering at times what shortcomings in personnel and material it would discover. Over the latter, the necessary steps are in hand; as regards the former, whilst certain adjustments and additions to complement will be asked for, I can be satisfied with the way in which the Fleet adapted itself to the new conditions.
8. This report, dealing as it does with an unfinished operation, is of an interim nature only. It will not, however, be out of place to remark on the helpfulness of the American Authorities both at Manus and Ulithi; I trust we did not ask for their assistance until we were faced with problems which frankly seemed beyond us, but whenever we did so appeal it was responded to with the utmost vigour. I would further add that the Communication Liaison Teams in all ships have lived up to their name in its best sense, and I am very conscious both of the specialist help given me personally by the Senior Communication Officer in my Flagship, Lieutenant Commander R.F. MORRIS, U.S.N.R., as also in general by Captain E.C. EWEN, U.S.N. His knowledge and views have been most valuable.
9. I have yet to find a more helpful and responsive attitude than that accorded to me by those American Authorities responsible for the provision and movements of Lifeguard Submarinos and aircraft: I know too that what their units have accomplished is no less a source of pleasure to them than it is to us. I am very grateful for their work.
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
H. B. RAWLINGS
VICE ADMIRAL.
Appendices
I - Introduction. -p.4
II - Narrative. -p.8
III - Oiling at Sea.-P.31
IV - Comunication. -p.35
V - Aircraft Direction and radar reporting. P.37