THE FOLLOWING IS CAPTAIN BOYD'S PRELIMINARY ACTION AND DAMAGE REPORT SUBMITTED A FORTNIGHT AFTER THE ATTACK ON HMS ILLUSTRIOUS. IT DIFFERS IN DETAIL FROM THE MORE COMPREHENSIVE DAMAGE REPORT (BOMB AND SHELL) IN THAT THE LATER ADMIRALTY DOCUMENT ASSEMBLED AND REVIEWED INFORMATION FROM ALL SHIP'S DEPARTMENTS, DOCKYARD ENGINEERS AND OTHER EXPERTS
Report from Commanding Officer, HMS Illustrious to Rear Admiral, Aircraft Carriers, Mediterranean
ADM 267/ 83 (& AIR 2-4221)
26 January 1941
Air attacks on HMS Illustrious, 10– 19 January 1941
I have the honour to submit the following report of the air attacks on H.M.S. ILLUSTRIOUS on 10th January, 1941, during Operation M.C. 4.
APPENDIX I. GENERAL NARRATIVE AND NAVIGATIONAL RECORD. (ALL TIMES ZONE – 2)
At 1007 ‘Illustrious’ was in company with ‘Warspite’ (Commander in Chief, Mediterranean) and ‘Valiant’ in position 36 ° 14′ N 12 ° 37 ¬, course 220 °, speed 18 knots. The following aircraft were flown off at this time:–
2 Swordfish as A/ S patrol for the Fleet.
1 ““ A/ S “ for ‘Gallant’ (had been mined or torpedoed at 0834)
5 Fulmars as fighter patrol at 14, 000′ over the Fleet
(Red Section 3 aircraft, White Section 2 aircraft).
5 Fulmars and 3 Swordfish landed on at 1030.
2. At 1120 an enemy aircraft was picked up by RD/ F at 28 miles and the Fulmars were directed towards it. Red Section made contact and found the enemy to be a single S. 79 at 12, 000 feet and shot it down at 1125.
3. Two Swordfish which had been on a search to the coast of Tripoli landed at 1143 , also one Fulmar of the Red Section, the sliding hood of the cockpit having blown off during the engagement with the S. 79. At 1145 course was altered to 110 degrees, the Fleet subsequently zigzagging by Blue Pendant.
4. First Attack – torpedo aircraft.
About 1220 unidentified aircraft were detected by RD/ F distant 6 miles coming in low and the fighters were directed towards them. The aircraft were sighted at 1222 and identified as 2 S. 79s making a torpedo attack. Long range and pom pom fire was opened but the aircraft completed their attack and dropped their torpedoes about 2500 yards on the starboard beam of ‘Illustrious’. Avoiding action was taken by altering course to port and both torpedoes passed astern. Red Section of Fulmars (now only 2) attacked the enemy during their getaway and estimated that both aircraft were damaged: these 2 Fulmars expended all their ammunition and reported to this effect by R/ T. White Section were unable to catch the S. 79s before they reached LINOSA Island, but found one S. 79 which had made a forced landing in a field and attacked it. (It was learnt subsequently that this aircraft had been there for some days).
5. At 1128 course was altered to 060 ° and station regained on ‘Warspite’. Course was altered to 110 ° at 1230 and speed increased to 18 knots at 1232.
6. 2nd attack – dive bombing. About 1225 a large group was detected by RD/ F at 28 miles approaching from the Northward. The situation at this time was that there were 4 Fulmars in the air but low down and some distance from the Fleet, 2 had expended their ammunition, the other 2 had expended about half. In accordance with the signalled flying programme relief fighters and A/ S patrols were due to be flown off at 1230, those in the air landing at 1245, to give an overlap. Immediately the large group were reported the Fighter Direction Officer ordered the Fulmars in the air to return over the Fleet and climb : he also asked that the reliefs should be flown off as quickly as possible.
7. The sequence of events in the next few minutes was as follows:–
1234. Commander in Chief ordered alteration of course to 210 ° to fly off aircraft (3 Swordfish and 4 Fulmars). 1235. Large formation sighted on the starboard quarter.
1236. Opened fire.
1237. Last aircraft off the deck.
1238. Course altered to 110 °, and loose formation ordered.
1239. The dive bombing attack developed and hits scored on ‘Illustrious’.
8. Tactics of attacking aircraft.
The attacking aircraft consisted of two formations of JUNKERS 87 with German markings. It was difficult to count the numbers exactly but the first formation consisted of 15 and the second of 20 to 30 aircraft. They were in a very loose and flexible formation, constantly changing their relative positions, and split when engaged by long range fire. It is estimated that the dive was started at about 12, 000 feet and checked at 6, 000 to 8, 000 feet before going into the aiming dive. Bomb release varied from about 1,500 feet in the first wave to 800 feet in later ones. Most aircraft continued to dive after releasing their bombs and flattened out low over the water having crossed the flight deck. At least one aircraft machine gunned the ship. The majority of the aircraft attacked ‘Illustrious’.
9. Most of the bombs dropped were large SAP bombs of about 500 kg. but some smaller bombs (either direct action or with very short delay) may have been used as the damage from certain hits was appreciably less than others.
10. There was a delay of a minute in opening fire as aircraft were actually being flown off when the target was sighted. Long range controlled fire and barrage fire was used by the 4.5” guns, and pom pom fire. Continuous alteration of course was made as avoiding action. One or two enemy aircraft were shot down by gunfire.
11. Damage to ship
There were 6 hits and several near misses in this attack. The probable sequence of hits with estimated sized bomb and damage done is as follows:
1 to 6 = Hits in 2nd attack.
X = Near misses in 2nd attack.
7 = Hit in 4th attack.
Y = Near misses in 4th attack.
No. 1 HIT
Probably 500 kg. Went through loading platform of P1 Pom Pom and struck the top of the side armour. May not have burst.
No. 2 HIT
Probably 500 kg. Went through the flight deck right forward on the port side, through the Recn. Space and burst below the flare causing a large number of fragment holes and 2 tears on the ship’s side. Caused a fire in the lamp room and decontamination store and flooded the paint store and the spare anchor gear store to a depth of 3 feet.
No. 3 HIT.
Probably a smaller G.P. bomb. Burst on S.2 pom pom killing the crew and most of the crew of S.1, but caused no casualties on the bridge.
No. 4 HIT.
About 250 kg. Hit the after lift and burst on the port side of the lift well, wrecking the lift and Y Group pump motors.
No. 5 HIT.
250 kg. or 500 kg. Hit the starboard forward corner of the lift well and may have exploded on the flight deck or been deflected and burst at the after end of the lift well.
No. 6 HIT.
500 kg. Pierced the flight deck and burst on the hangar deck in which it made a large hole and caused violent explosion in the ward room flat. This bomb blew up the foremost lift, bulged the hangar deck forward and the combined effect of this and No. 4 wrecked the hangar fire screens and set fire to C hangar. Many casualties were caused in the hangar and the ward room flat; all leads and piping through ward room flat destroyed. Fires were started in the cabin flats on the upper deck abaft 156 bulkhead.
In addition to these 6 hits there were at least 3 very near misses, splinters from which caused damage and casualties.
12. Summary of operations by Fulmars.
(2 aircraft) had no ammunition having already shot down one S.79 and attacked 2 others. Made dummy attacks on 2 JU.87s. and forced them to turn away.
(2 aircraft) had 50% ammunition remaining and was returning from attacking T/B S.79s. Shot down one certain and 2 probable JU.87s. after they had bombed.
(2 aircraft) had only just flown off. Shot down one JU.87 before it had bombed and one after it had bombed. One Fulmar shot down, pilot picked up wounded, air gunner killed.
(2 aircraft) had only just flown off. Shot down two JU.87s. after they had bombed.
All aircraft (except the one that had been shot down) then proceeded to Hal Far and those serviceable were refuelled and rearmed and returned to the Fleet later. At 1320 Vice Admiral, Malta, was asked by signal to send fighter protection and Hurricanes were sent. No signal was received reporting that they had been sent and they were fired at and one was damaged.
13. When this very severe and brilliantly executed D/B attack was over, the ship was on fire fore and aft, the flight deck was wrecked, and I decided to make for Malta at once, informing the Commander in Chief who detached ‘Jaguar’ and ‘Hasty’ as screen.
It was immediately clear that the steering gear had been affected as difficulty was experienced in checking the ship swinging, but at this time the electric steering gear was not entirely out of action.
At about 1255 the electric steering gear failed completely as did the rudder indicator from the rudder head; the ‘not under control’ signal was hoisted and the ship’s swing checked with the engines. By 1303 the ship was again under control from the steam steering gear in the Centre Engine Room and a course of 100° was set, speed being worked up to 26 knots by 1313.
14. 3rd attack – high level bombing.
At 1329, 7 aircraft approached at 14, 000 feet and were reported by ‘Valiant’ (‘Illustrious’ RD/F was put out of action in the previous attack). This formation was sighted and engaged well before bomb release; aim was inaccurate and the bombs fell scattered, the whole attack being similar to those carried out by the Italians recently. There were no hits but the steam steering gear failed at this time and the ship was out of control and turning in circles. A and B groups only fired, S and Y being out of action.
15. Speed was reduced to 21 knots by 1338 and to 15 knots by 1345 and at 1348 the ship was again under control from the Steam Steering engine. Course was set for Malta (now 74 miles distant) and speed increased to 20 knots, but at 1350 she was again out of control and began to swing rapidly to port. Speed was reduced accordingly. Further efforts were made to continue using the rudder but they were unsuccessful and orders were given to put the rudder amidships which was accomplished. By 1435 the ship was under control steering by the engines and was heading for Malta, speed being gradually increased. The ship was steered by the engines from this time onwards.
16. 4th attack – dive bombing.
At 1604 another group of aircraft was reported by ‘Valiant’ to be closing; it was sighted at long range at 1609 and consisted of about 15 JU.87s escorted by 5 Fighters. They were engaged by the forward 4.5 guns with controlled and barrage fire and later by 5 pom poms. This attack was neither so well synchronised or so determined as that at 1240. The first wave of about 6 aircraft attacked from astern and both quarters and were well engaged, fire being continuous in spite of difficulty of seeing targets to port owing to the smoke and haze from the fire in the hangar. Only 2 bombs fell near the ship. Three aircraft carried out an attack from the starboard beam at least a minute after the first wave; the last aircraft pressed his attack well home and scored a near miss abreast the funnel. The remaining 6 aircraft were seen retiring to the N.E. at a considerable height, and 2 attempted an attack through clouds on the port beam, but on being engaged made off without dropping their bombs.
Nine bombs were dropped, one (size not known) hit the after lift causing casualties among those tending wounded and putting out fires. There were two very near misses, one starboard side abreast the island and one close to the quarter deck which caused damage aft and killed a number of wounded and those tending them on the quarter deck.
Avoiding action was taken by altering course. There were no Fulmars present during this attack but there may have been some Hurricanes. The early sighting of this and subsequent formations was due to the prompt receipt (on Auxiliary Wave) of ‘Valiant’s’ RD/F reports.
At 1643 the ship was in position 224° Gozo Lt. 12 miles, steering 125° for the end of the Swept Channel and making good 17 to 18 knots. A list of about 5° to the starboard had developed, chiefly due to the amount of water in the hangar and in the wardroom flat. This water came from the hangar sprays and hoses and could not run away as the scuppers were blocked with debris.
17. 5th attack – High level and dive bombing.
At 1656 ‘Valiant’ reported enemy aircraft at 52 miles, closing. Seventeen aircraft were sighted at 1710 outside gun range. They circled astern of ‘Illustrious’ and worked up into the sun from her but then attacked the battle fleet with High Level and Dive Bombing.
18. At 1803 ‘Illustrious’ reached the entrance to the Swept Channel. Tugs had been asked for to meet the ship there but as there were only 2 A/S vessels to be seen I continued up the channel still steering by main engines and gradually reducing speed. Sunset was at 1808.
19. 6th attack – Torpedo aircraft.
Malta reported by W/T that enemy aircraft were approaching and at 1922 2 aircraft were heard and sighted on the starboard bow. A blind barrage from 4.5” guns and pom poms was fired. No torpedo tracks were seen and nothing more was seen or heard of the aircraft.
20. At 1930 ‘Hasty’ on the starboard beam reported that she was investigating a contact and shortly afterwards fired depth charges.
At 1935 the ship was turned to port for the harbour entrance which was closed at slow speed waiting for tugs. At 2025 a tug was secured aft and then 2 tugs were secured forward, the ship being about ¾ mile from the Grand Harbour entrance.
21. ‘Illustrious’ passed St. Elmo Breakwater Light at 2104 and berthed starboard side to at Parlatorio Wharf at 2215.
22. The work of landing the wounded and dead was begun. All wounded men were got away at 0200 and the dead by 0300.
The fires aft were finally extinguished by 0300.
APPENDIX II. REPORTS BY CREWS OF FULMAR AIRCRAFT OPERATING OVER THE FLEET.
Pilot. Lieut. W. L. Barnes. Observer. Lieut. Vincent-Jones. Aircraft. 6A.
Took off with 6Z in company. H.A. guns opened fire immediately we left the deck. When at about 1, 000 feet observed ship being heavily attacked by dive-bombers (JU.87′s) which pulled out at about 1, 000 feet. Chased two of these as they pulled out, and they separated.
Sub-Lieutenant Lowe (6Z) attacked one while we attacked the other; the latter pulled up in a steep zoom and I was able to get in a short burst before my aircraft stalled. The enemy rear gunner opened fire obtaining one hit from above through hydraulic pipes in the rear cockpit. After this we did not see this enemy aircraft again. Climbed to 6, 000 feet and observed single JU.87 slightly above us over convoy. Pursued it and as we approached it jettisoned its bomb and turned to Northward. Got in long bursts astern – the first put rear gunner out of action and subsequent bursts caused it to go down in shallow dive into the sea, the pilot having been hit. Ammunition being expended, we made for Malta landing at about 1345.
1650: Took off from Hall Far [sic] in 6F with 6K (Sub.Lieut. Orr.) and 6C (Sub.Lieut. Roberts.) Controlled by W/T from VALIANT. Immediately after crossing coast ran into eight or nine JU.87’s steering North after having attacked Battle Fleet. Got in astern attack on one of these, putting rear gunner out of action. My reflector sight went out during this attack so I broke off to renew bulb. Reformed the section and remained in the air until 1820, being controlled by VALIANT. Did not encounter further enemy aircraft.
Damage to 6A.
(a) Two gravity feed pipes shot away in rear cockpit.
(b) Bullet through port aileron.
Pilot. Sub.Lieut Lowe. Air Gunner. L.A. Kensett. Aircraft 6Z.
Took off in company with 6A and was last seen engaging one of a pair of JU.87’s. The enemy rear gunner hit the water cooler of 6Z but was then shot down by Sub.Lieut. Lowe and seen to crash into the sea. At the same time another JU.87 got on his tail wounding Sub.Lieut Lowe in the shoulder and killing L.A. Kensett. Sub.Lieut. Lowe immediately broke away but at the same time his engine stopped and he made a forced landing into the sea. Sub. Lieut. Lowe cleared himself with difficulty and went to the rear cockpit and found his air gunner under water and obviously dead. He was unable to release him before the machine sank. Sub.Lieut. Lowe was picked up after about 20 minutes by H.M.S. JAGUAR.
Pilot. Lieut. Henley. Observer. Mid. Cullen. Aircraft. 6F.
1015: Took off from ILLUSTRIOUS in company with 6G (Sub.Lieut. Marshall and 6H (Sub.Lieut. Griffith). Proceeded to 15, 000 feet for patrol. After several false alarms (friendly aircraft).
1120: Directed on to one S.79 at about 11, 000 feet. Carried out a Section beam attack. Then attacked from astern and below until it burst into flames and dived in. Returned to patrol over Fleet with 6H and 6G returned to land on.
1210: Saw 2 S.79′s making torpedo attack on Fleet. Dived after them and carried out stern attack about 5 miles from Fleet towards Linosa at a height of about 50 feet. Attack continued until ammunition was expended. Put starboard motor of leading S.79 out of action and silenced rear guns of both aircraft. Returned to Fleet to land on but encountered barrage so sheered [sic] off. Carried out dummy attack on two JU.87′s which turned away and dived to sea level. Then proceeded to Malta as instructed by R/T and W/T. Landed 1340.
1700: Patrolled over ILLUSTRIOUS – nothing sighted.
1830: Landed at Hal Far.
Pilot. Sub-Lieut. Griffith. Air Gunner. L.A. Stevens. Aircraft. 6H.
In company with Lieut. Henley throughout – narrative similar.
Pilot. Sub-Lieut. Orr. Air Gunner L.A. Douet. Aircraft. 6K.
1015: Took off with Sub-Lieut. Hogg (6Y) in company. Climbed to 15, 000 feet. Directed to several false alarms.
1210: Ship reported Fleet being attacked by Torpedo Bombers. Sighted them closing the Fleet.≠ When barrage opened they turned away to Westward towards Linosa. Unable to catch them by the time they reached this island. Observed an S.79 which had force landed in a field – some troops were surrounding it. Opened up on this S.79 and carried out ground strafing, repeatedly hitting the S.79 with tracer. * Dived from 4, 000 ft. to sea level.
1220: Returning to ship, received order to resume patrol at full speed and climb.
1235: Saw a large number (at least 20) JU.87′s bombing Fleet with others above. Attacked JU.87′s after they had pulled out from dive. First attack sent one spinning down into the sea. Attacked two others and caused them to lose height and disabled rear-gunners –consider it unlikely that either of them reached their base.
1650: Took off in company with 6F and 6C. Attacked formation of JU.87′s (at least 8) immediately we passed over the coast. They were proceeding Northward after having attacked the Fleet. Engaged in dogfight with these and definitely damaged two, but did not see what happened to them in the bad visibility.
1830: Landed at Hall Far [sic].
Pilot. Sub-Lieut. Hogg. Air Gunner. L.A. Oakes. Aircraft. 6Y.
1015: Took off in company with Sub-Lieut. Orr in 6K. Climbed to 10, 000 feet.
1215: After several unfruitful chases we were put on to two S.79′s which Red Section were attacking. They made off to Linosa which they reached before we got within range. At Linosa we broke off and ground strafed one S.79 which had force landed in a field – surrounded by a crowd of people. Light ground M.G. fire encountered. Returned to Fleet climbing at full throttle.
1230: Arrived over Fleet at about 4, 000 feet and encountered a barrage. Circled Fleet with wheels down at 1,500 feet to identify, then observed about twenty JU.87′s above leaving Fleet in Northwesterly direction. Pursued this group and opened fire on the rear aircraft from astern. Continued firing until within 200 yards when I was forced to break off to deal with a JU.87 which had got on my tails [sic]. Before breaking off, I noticed smoke pouring from the fuselage of my first target. My air gunner told me that this aircraft broke away and lost height. By this time I got round on to the tail of the second JU.87 he was about ½ mile away. I set a course for Malta due to lack of petrol and landed at 1335.
Pilot. Sub-Lieut. Sewell. Air Gunner L.A. Tribe. Aircraft 6Q.
1235: Took off in company with 6C (Sub-Lieut. Roberts). Climbed up to 8, 000 feet during which time I noted the ship being attacked by JU.87 dive bombers. I counted 15 in the first wave and this was followed by two further waves which appeared equal in size. These waves were peeling off from at least 10, 000 feet. The air gunner confirmed that there were three distinct waves of about 12 aircraft per wave. I attacked one JU.87 at about 7, 000 feet from the quarter after it had pulled out from a dive and after a short burst it made a vertical dive to the sea. I then attacked another from the stern and followed it down to about 3, 000 feet at about 15 miles from the Fleet, when I left it with a stream of liquid pouring from port wing root. The rear gunner had ceased firing. I returned to the Fleet and 6C (Sub-Lieut. Roberts) formed up with me. He told me over R/T that he had a leak and had expended all ammunition. Returned to Malta on instructions by R/T from ship in company with 6C.
1400: Landed at Hal Far.
Damage to 6Q.
(a) 2 bullets in airscrew.
(b) 1 in Hydraulic system.
(c) 1 explosive bullet in starboard tail root.
(d) 1 non-explosive in port tail plane elevator.
Pilot. Sub-Lieut Roberts. Air. Aircraft 6C.
1235: Took off in company with Sub-Lieut. Sewell (6Q). Unable to retract port wheel; while endeavouring to do this, observed the first wave of dive-bombers attacking the ship. Had climbed to 3, 000 feet. I noticed some of these JU.87′s making away to Northward. Engaged one of these and saw it swerve, drop out of formation and continue down in a left hand turn into the sea. Starboard wheel had come down in this combat and with both wheels down speed and climb were very poor. Joined up with Sub-Lieut. Sewell and proceeded to Malta as ordered by R/T.
1650: Took off with Lieut. Barnes and Sub-Lieut. Orr and proceeded Southwards towards the Fleet. Almost immediately after crossing the coast encountered about seven JU.87′s making away to the Northward, having dropped their bombs. Attacked the left hand aircraft of the formation, two others dropped behind and came in on my tail. On completing the first attack, turned to attack one of the two who had dropped back. Registered large number of hits on his fuselage which caused his rear gunner to cease firing. Did not notice other damage. He continued away to Northward. Climbed to 12, 000 feet and patrolled until dark when the Section returned to Hal Far.
NOTES ON JU.87 DIVE-BOMBERS ENCOUNTERED.
1. All those encountered bore the standard German markings.
2. Camouflage. Black and grey mottling above, half black and half white below. General camouflage similar to a Fulmar.
3. Tactics. (i) Single JU.87 when attacked from astern will pull the nose up in order to allow the rear gunner a good downward shot.
(ii) If attacked in formation, two of formation drop astern and use their front gun on the attacking aircraft.
4. A Fulmar should have no difficulty in catching or outmanoeuvring a JU.87. Being of metal construction, a JU.87 will not burn like an Italian aircraft. JU.87′s appear to be well protected from stern attacks. Every endeavour should be made to carry out beam and quarter attacks.
Certain: 1- S.79, 5- Ju87
Probable: 2- Ju87
Damaged: 5-Ju87, 1- S.79
APPENDIX III: REPORT ON THE FIRES IN THE HANGAR
At the time of the first dive bombing attack there were 9 Swordfish and 4 Fulmars in the hangar in the positions shown in the sketch. All Swordfish were arme dwith either SAP or A/S bombs and there were 6 torpedoes fully charge and fitted with Duplex pistols in readiness for a striking force.
2. Flying off had just been completed before the attack developed. The forward and after fire screens were down, centre fire screen up and armoured doors open. A considerable number of Fleet Air Arm officres and men were in the hangar which was their action station. In the space of a few minutes bombs burst in the after lift well and one on the hangar deck in the middle of C hangar. Those fire screens which were down were blown along the hangar like paper, a number of men were killed at once, including the hands stationed in the access lobbies to operate the sprayers, the hangar was full of smoke and fires started.
3. The Commander (F) went down from the bridge to S2 hangar access lobby, where he found Lieutenant Commander Jago. Together they pulled out one more wounded man, and, as there was a big fire in "C" hangar, the access door was shut. "B" hangar sprayers were already on.
4. At S3 access lobby, the outer door was closed and the inner one open with a fire inside the hangar. "C" hangar sprayers were not on, the rating stationed in this lobby having been killed. It was then found that the sprayer valve was jammed. The conditions at P3 access lobby were similar bu the Commander (F) and Lieutenant Gregory managed to open the sprayer valve about half way before they had to get out owing to the heat.
5. In "A" hangar there was a great deal of smoke but no visible fires and the sprayers were working. A party was trying to close the armoured doors, (No.1 fire curtain having been blown away), but were unable to get them more than half closed owing to the distortion of the deck.
6. From this time onwards, frequent sorties were made by small parties into the hangar to find out what was going on and put out fires. On each occasion something was accomplished before the party was forced to go out for fresh air. All four Fulmars were burning fiercely, as were the overhead stores, which were difficult to put out, but "A" and "B" hangars were not burnt, presumably because there was a good space between them and the 2 foremost Fulmars. It was later discovered that the sprayer ring main in "C" hangar was pierced and the sprayers were therefore not working properly if at all.
7. In the second dive bombing attack at 1615, there was another hit in the after lift well causing further casualties among those dealing with the damage and fires from the previous hits.
8. A great deal of water collected in the hangar from the sprayers and hoses, the scuppers being blocked by wreckage. This water and that in the flat below (much of which rand down from the hangar) gave the ship a considerable list to starboard and could not be got rid of except by making a hole in the starboard after exhaust fan trunking in the side of the hangar to allow the water to run out.
9. The fires in the overhead stores were finally extinguished at 0200/12
10. Damage to aircraft was as follows :-
4 Fulmars burnt out.
5 Swordfish written off.
4 Swordfish repairable.
11. Of the six torpedoes, one warhead was hit by a splinter causing a gash 8" long and about 2" deep. Another warhead was dent one balance chamber was hit by a splinter and all the air escaped. All other torpedoes remained full air charge and were undamaged apart from minor things. Some of the .303 ammunition went off, but no bombs exploded.
APPENDIX IV: REPORT ON DAMAGE CONTROL
The Commander (E) was at Damage Control Headquarters from 12/10 until 0730/11. The Commander was at his Action Station in the lower steering position when the ship was hit. From then onwards he was constantly moving round the ship, directing operations where necessary and reporting to the Captain on the bridge periodically.
2. From the fact that the ship was saved and brought into harbour, it is evident that the entire ship's organisation, the centralised control of damage, and the initiative and energy shown by all was of a very high order. Telephonic communication was maintained except for the after part of the ship. A feature of the orderly control of damage was the way in which information was passed to and from D.C.H.Q. A list of written reports made at the time is attached.
Date - 10.1.41: From D.C.O. to Bridge.
Hit below S6 Cross passage, No. 4 Dynamo on fire. Both steering motors have been off the board, but No.2 is now running. Steam steering engine is now running.
1315: Reports of fire :"- For'd heads, For'd Decontamination Store, For'd hangar, Outside rating Pilots and Observers Mess (Port Side).
1325: All wing W.T.C's reorted correct.
1330: Fire for'd in Lamp Room is under control. Busy engaged in locating Forward. Fire under control in Decontamination Store and Lamp Cabitn. Continuing to find extent of damage. No.1 Repair Party is endeavouring to help to close forward hangar door. Now completely closed. Fire in hangar under control. Fire in Decontamination Store is out, and Paint Shop is flooded.
1340: Holes in Port Side from For'd to 27 Bulkhead.
1346: Big fire aft, abaft 151 Station, below hangar deck. Split in No.3 hangar spray pump ischerge. D.G. gear gractured port side 17 bulkhead. Main Deck Ship's Company urinals.
1352 Water entering No.1 W/T transmitting Room is coming from hangar and cannot be stopped.
1358: Hole on water line,Port Side between 6 and 11 bulkheads. Spare anchor store believed to be flooded.
1410: All dynamos on load. Hole Port Side. Spare Anchor Gear Store being dealt with, with apparent success. Stanchions on Seamen's Mess Deck being dealt with by Shipwrights.
1420: All flooding indicators between 17 and 37 Bulkheads are down.
1425: Shoring of Seaman's Mess Deck for'd by the damaged stanchions is now complete.
14.30: All flooding indicators in No. 2 Damage Control section reported correct. Beams reported distorted on Upper Stoker's Mess Deck. Job in hand. All flooding indicators correct between 37-73 bulkheads.
1430: No report from fires aft. Fires in Decontamination Store is out.
1440: Bridge wishes to steer by main engines, as rudder will only move one way when operated by T.D. pump. All ruder indicators are out of action - presumably Rudder transmitter in Tiller Flat is out of action. As far as it can be ascertained by T.D. steering pump hunting gear - rudder is amidships as far as we can judge by hunting gear.
1440: Holed and badly pierced Steam to 17 Bulkhead. Flooded paint room main deck. Spare anchor gear store flooded to a depth of about 3 feet. Holed above water line. Trying to pump out to see if holed below water line. Holes now plugged in spare anchor gear store by shipwrights. All state of compartment indicators from 17 to 69 bulkheads examined and found correct by E.R.A. Chown, No.1 Repair Party. Pumping forward, report results later.
1450: Deck seal after lift, out of action. Failure of Power for'd Chain hoists. (Power now correct). Fracture in D.G. Gear System. (Report incorrect, insulation only pierced). Damage to stanchions Stokers' Upper Mess Deck - Shoring complete. Numerous holes in Ship's side adjacent to spare anchor gear store.(Stores believed to be intact but hatch is now shut down. Store believed now not flooded).
NOTE: There are no signs of compartments being flooded, (from previous report).
1450: Summary of reports :-
Fires aft - not under control
Fire in Decontamination Gear Store is out
Fire in lamp room is out
Pain Shop (damaged) flooded.
Steering Gera. Steering by Main Engines.
Fresh water pipe fractured 46 B.H. System isolated.
Hole on W.L. in Spare Anchor Gear Store, being dealth with.
Stanchions between 37-46 bulkheads (damage) - Shoring complete.
No.4 Dynamo correct and running
Hangar Spray System fractured by Port Midships access lobby (false alarm)
1545: Action to correct list is sluicing oil from Starboard(unreadable) oil fuel tanks to Port (unreadable) tanks
1545: All compartments between 37-61 bulkheads reported correct, no flooding, For'd F and B pumps on firemain.
1550: Fire aft now confined abaft 166 B.H. below hangar deck, situation greatly improved.
1550: Slight glow can be seen through PS access door 80 feet aft of PS door on Starboard side, spray is working.
1600: Cabin flat abaft Ward Room flat is 4(?) feet deep in water Starboard after corner, Water has come from holes in Hangar Deck, all piles, cables etc in W.H. flat have fallen to deck.
1605: Chief stoker Palmer has had pump on Compartments 11-17, 17-34 and armature stars. Pump has drawn air from all compartments. If suction pipe is intact it is presumed compartments are empty.
1615: All wing W.T C's reported:-
1625: A bomb appears to have pierced flight deck and all decks down to Upper Decl. Appears to have burst on Hangar Deck level. Very large hole in Hangar Deck. Fire appears to be raging in store under Flight Deck, Station 136, i.e, Ward Room Flat.
1630: Fire in Hangar (from Mr. Barton). Only fire to be seen is the one in a store just under Flight Deck. Spraying has stopped.
1635: Portable pump is being taken to W.R. flat to try and pump away water collected.
1640: Completed sluicing oil from Star'd wing tanks to D.B. oil fuel tanks.
1645: Reports from all D.C. parties. Nos 1, 2 and 3 Sections have reported no further damage.
1705: Report Received - sparks and smoke are coming from aft lift motor room, port. Action taken - not transmitted because of conflicting reports and fact that there was no power on after lift.
1720: Fire aft is still burning. Extra hands have been sent to deal with it, andthe party is reported to be doing very good work. This appears to be our only fire.
1730: After F.W. Systems, down supply from gravity tank -
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1945: Water has entered the flat below the W.O.'s Cabin flat. Water is 5' below W.O.'s Cabin Flat.
1955: Portable pump in now running in W.R. Flat.
2000: Water in Servery flat was due to flooding of Pom Pom R.U. magazine on upper Gallery Deck. Valve was shut to stop water coming down.
2000: Fire under lift well aft is re-starting. All available hands have been sent.
2005: Fire reported port foremost end of hangar. Fire party dealing with it.
2015: No2 dynamo is on load again.
2045: Reported that all port boats are out of action.
2055: General Reports received: Cabin flat 139-151 Upper Deck is now pumped dry on Port Side. Cabin flat 139-151 Main Deck has about 1' of water.
Remains of fire in the cabin of Lieut. Commanders Russell and Stratton was glowing but now extinguished. Two small fires in hangar roof are being dealt with.
Water in hangar has gone.
There is still 4' fo water below Starboard aft. gang-way but portable pump is still running.
2145: Officer's cabin flat on upper deck 139-151 has now been pumped dry, except that water from fire fighting operations in hangar is getting to flat through small holes, and water is entering slowly from below through slight strain in deck.
2150: Warrant Officers' cabin flat is reported to have 3' of water on starboard side, but is dry on port side. Layer of oil is on top of water below W.O.'s cabin flat.
Throught to be due to oil leak in C.7 and C.8 oil fuel tanks.
2225: Fire below Quarter Deck is now under control. It is just smoldering.
2355 Fire aft below Quarter Deck now reported out. Hose left running gently in case of further outbreak.
Bomb thought to have exploded at upper or main deck level. Force of explosion outwards to ship's side.
0110: Bandroom completely gutted by fire. Officers' hads appear O.K. bar the two port foremost, where D.G. gear insulation is smouldering.
Officers' baggage Store upper deck untouched.
Firemain smashed about 161.
Aft Captstan Machinery Room apparently intact.
Steering gear cabin flat flooded to 1' below the deck. Bomb appears to have come down 158-161.
0140: All fires extinguished in hangar.
0215: Stopped water entering hangar - shut off fresh water from fore gravity tank to aft
APPENDIX XIII. GENERAL SUMMING UP.
Five air attacks were made on ILLUSTRIOUS during the day, two by dive bombers, two by torpedo aircraft, and one by high level bombers.
2. The first dive bombing attack was the heaviest and nearly all the damage was done at this time. It was brilliantly executed and pressed home with determination.
3. This attack came at a bad moment for the fighters. Those in the air had already been engaged in two combats and were low down, and with little ammunition remaining. Relief fighters were ready on deck, but as the whole fleet had to be turned by signal from the Commander-in-Chief before they could be flown off, valuable minutes were wasted. In any case the Fulmar has not sufficient climbing speed to ensure being able to counter this type of attack, particularly if a heavy attack is launched shortly after a minor or diversionary attack.
4. Six hours of daylight remained after the action [during which the] serious damage was sustained. The guns crews (with about 60% of the armament) beat off the subsequent attacks. The damage and fires were got under control. The ship was taken to Malta and up the swept channel without the use of the rudder.
5. In conclusion I wish to pay tribute to the sound construction of the ship which enabled her to withstand such heavy punishment.
APPENDIX XIV. RECOMMENDATIONS.
(a) That a more flexible organisation be introduced as regards flying off, so that the carrier may have more freedom in moments of urgency such as occurred on this day. It is suggested that an emergency flying off signal is required similar to the emergency landing signal so that when the situation demands it the carrier turns and flies off at once. This is particularly necessary where the Fleet Flagship is not fitted with R.D./F.
(b) An interceptor fighter with a good rate of climb is essential for encountering this type of attack. At least twelve in the air would be required to make any impression on the enemy and double that number to keep them off. These requirements can only be met by a single seater …