Document: Formidable, May 4, KamikazeDamage (Bomb & Shell)

Subject: C.A.F.O.2489/42 – Action Damage Report – 4th. May, 1945

FROM … The Commanding Officer, H.M.S. “FORMIDABLE”.
DATE … 11th May, 1945
No. 774/026.


The following is the sequence of events before and after the attack on H.M.S. “FORMIDABLE” and a KAMIKAZE Zeke on 4th May, 1945.

Alarm Starboard!
By Geoffrey Brooke


1. At approximately 1100 I on 4th May, FORMIDABLE was steaming at 20 knots, course 180 degrees in company with the Fleet; Cruising Diagram No. 5B. Aircraft on deck were three Corsairs and eleven Avengers; two of the Corsairs were due to fly off at 1130 for Bombardment Spotting.


    Fine and cloudy. Visibility good. Wind force 3 from 070 degrees. Cloud 7/10 Cumulus at 3000 feet. Intermittent bright sun.


    The hands were at Action Stations. Special precautions for possible Suicide Bomber Attack had been taken, a description of which is given in the Damage Control section III, paragraph one.

2. Shortly after 1100, several bogies were detected and three were observed to be closing the Fleet, and were tracked in to 15 miles. Fleet C.A.P. were intercepting but no aircraft was tracked right into the ground wave.


Damage Control State II was ordered at about 1112 and Damage Control State I at 1115. Anti-Hawk Stations were ordered at 1130. 

3. At about 1127, the two Corsairs were flown off for Bombardment spotting on a course of 073 degrees and ship then turned back to starboard. The deck park of eleven Avengers was being taxied forward in single line.


4. At 1131, a Zeke dived from cloud, bearing 170 degrees at about 1.5 miles and flew straight down the Flight Deck, machine-gunning the aircraft on deck, and hten turned sharply to starboard over the bow. The wheel was immediately put hard-a-starboard. The Zeke completed a tight circle of about 1500 yards at 700 feet on the starboard side of the ship and then dived onto the ship. Although full wheel was on, it appeared that the ship was not swinging enough to upset the second attack.
It is considered that a bomb of 500lb SAP type was released just before the crash. The Zeke was blown to pieces.


5. No gun was fired during the first attack – the aircraft was not seen until it was almost over the flight deck. As it circled to starboard for the final dive it was fired on by S.1 Pam-pom (much impeded by a Corsair on the outrigger before the gun) and by S.2 and S.3 Pom-poms and 11 Twin and 2 Single Oerlikons. ‘A’ Group of 4.5” fired 4 broadsides each in barrage fire, but owing to the high rate of change of bearing this was ineffective. ‘X’ Group fired 64 rounds at a second Zeke, sighted at 090 degrees shortly after the attack. This aircraft was being chased by Seafires and was seen to be splashed by them.
The Zeke which hit the ship was seen to be on fire before crashing, but was not deflected from its purpose thereby.


6. A sheet of flame rose to funnel height, followed by intense black smoke. Splinters penetratind many of the compartments on the Island port side, severing many electric cables.


A hole 2ft square was blown in the flight deck armour at 79 station, 9 foot from the centre and the flight deck armour depressed over an area of approximately 24 feet by 20 feet. A splinter from the Armoured deck passed down through the hangar, centre boiler-room downtakes and centre boiler-room and came to rest in the inner bottom, having penetrated an oil fuel tank. Severing the steam pipes in the Centre Boiler Room compelled the evacuation of this compartment and speed was reduced to 24 knots.


    All radar W.A. was put out of action, Types 281 and 79 W.A.R. aerial arrays having been destroyed by blast or splinters. Type 277 aerial was temporarily out of action. All V/HF failed, communication on Inter-F.D.O. Wave and R/T communication with the Flagship was maintained.


    One Avenger close to the scene of the incident was blown over the side and a second set on fire close forward of the Island. This aircraft burned fiercely but the fire was brought under control after 20 minutes. The other Avengers were damaged by the original machine gunning, blast and splinters. The foremost Barrier Unit was distorted and the Barrier rendered unserviceable.


7. The ship was under control throughout and after the incident was turned stern to wind and engines manoeuvred to bring smoke and flames vertical. When the fire was under control, speed was increased to 18 knots and subsequent to 22 knots.


8. Some water and foam from the fire-fighting on deck cascaded down into the hangar through the hole, and as soon as the flight deck had been cleared, a temporary filling of wood and concrete was made over the hole, the patch being covered by plates welded to the deck.

9. FORMIDABLE was in a position to operate aircraft with one barrier at 1700, speed 24 knots.


10. It is regretted that 2 officers and 6 ratings were killed and 6 officers and 41 ratings wounded in the attack. One further rating died of wounds on 7th May. Names of casualties are attached as Appendix to Section XII – Medical. My signals timed 05 1203Z, 06 0100 Z and 07 0622 Z May refer.


11.  Photographs taken on the flight deck after the attack are enclosed.



1. 500lb S.A.P. and suicide landing by one ZEKE

2. 10 feet in diving release.

3. 9 foot from centre of the Flight Deck at 79 Station.

4. Armoured Flight Deck was perforated, but not penetrated.

5. Not applicable

6. Flight Deck – See section X, paragraph (i).

7. Hangar etc. Fire curtains between ‘A’ and ‘B’ Hangars: Centre post buckled, curtain rollers bent, but all considered repairable. Motors complete with reduction gearing, 2 in number, damaged beyond repair; control circuits wiring defective – requires renewal. Fire curtains between ‘B’ and ‘C’ hangars; control circuit wiring defective – requires part renewal.

8. Slight blast damage to island generally.

9. Extensive but minor splinter damage to Island port side.

10. Splinters of sizes 0.5” to 9” x 3” pierced port side of Island, which is 15lbs protective plating (60 – 70 feet). Pieces of flight deck pierced Hangar Deck (14lbs – 22 feet, downtake trunk (1lb- 27 feet), escape hatch (15lbs – 40 feet) and inner bottom (17lbs – 64 feet). Largest fragment about 12” x 5”.

11. Detonation complete. Largest fragment found weighted 3/4lb.

12. All W.A. Radar out of action. Splinters and blast damage to aerials. Type 285 on ‘B’ Director, aerial leads severed. Centre Boiler Room evacuated. Speed reduced to 24 knots. 11 Aircraft damged beyond repair. Operation of aircraft not possible for some hours owing to hole in Flight Deck and failure of Safety Barriers. Gun armament only slightly affected. 55 Casualties.

13. See detailed technical reports.

14. An Avenger on deck was set on fire. Splinters penetrated an Oerlikon R.U. locker and started a small fire which went out before any explosion took place. A large splinter penetrated S.2 Pom-pom Ready Use Magazine and and damaged belted rounds in the trays. The Cordite filling of one cartridge which was split open had burst in the magazine. It is considered most fortunate that no explosion occurred and bears testimony to the high quality of the 2-pdr. Fuzes that none of the damaged ones detonated a round.

15. Not applicable.

16. Not applicable.

C.A.F.O. 2489/42. SECTION III


    The ship assumed D.C. State I at 0530 on the 4th May and immediately steps were taken against a suicide bomber landing in the deck park, to wit – hoses were run up from the Gallery Decks with nozzles lightly stopped to the Flight Deck lobbies giving a total of 8 in each lobby, all Island Foamits (5) were massed in the main Island lobby. All the above was in addition to the normal Flight Deck fire fighting appliances.

2.     At about 0640 the ship reverted to a modified D.C. State III, closing up when necessary to State II or State I during the day. This reduction in the D.C. State entails the ship being left shut down as for D.C. State I, doors, hatches, etc. remainin g closed except fr certain 2 clup Upper Deck doors and 2 Hangar Deck armoured hatches which are left open to improve the living conditions and the D.C. personnel revert to watches.

3.    At about 1105 several bogies were reported to be closing the Fleet and at 1112 D.C. State II was ordered followed  very shortly by D.C. State I at 1115. It is now considered that this raid approached the Fleet unobserved by Radar.
    At 1127 two aircraft for bombardment spotting duties took off and the deck park commenced to taxy forward.

4.    At 11.30 special precautions against suicide bombers (Anti-Hawk Stations) were ordered and the following precautions were taken:-
    Both lifts raised and scaled.
    Both Hangar armoured doors closed.
    Special Flight Deck Fire Parties closed up in the nottings and lobbies. (see note (a)).
    Everyone cleared off the Flight Deck and those whose duties permit, lying down.
    Squadron Action Gangs closed up forward and aft (see note (b)).
Notes:     (a) Detailed from A/C Handling Party and stationed in the nettings or on the gun sponsons adjacent to the foam generators.
                (b) 20 gangs consisting of 1 P.O. + 10 are detailed and close up on the Upper Gallery Deck forward and/or aft depending on the position of the deck park. As aircraft were being taxied forward at the time of the incident, both the special Flight Deck Fire Parties and Action Squadron Gangs were only at about 90 per cent strength.
    At 1132 the order was given to stop taxying aircraft and all hands to clear off the Flight Deck.

5. The Incident

    The Kamakazi hit nearly amidships abreast the Island at 1134, the bomb being released just before the aircraft hit the deck.
    One Avenger A/C positioned abaft the Island was blown over the side and another amidships abreast the foremost end of the Island was severely damaged and burst into flames.
    Small fires also broke out amongst the fire-fighting gear abreast the after end of the Island, amongst the Clarkat tractors parked between the barriers on the starboard side of the Flight Deck, in the Flight Deck Control Room and A.H.P. Shelter.

6.     A hole about two foot square was blown in the Flight Deck amidships abreast the Island and a deep depression of about 2 foot deep in the centre and about 24’ x 20’ was formed.

7.    The whole of the port side of the Island was perforated by flying debrist but the glass windows of the Bridge although shattered did not fly.

8.    A large splinter from the armoured deck penetrated the Hangar Deck, the horizontal partition between the Starboard and Centre Boiler Room Downtakes, the escape hatch, which was shut, to the Centre Boiler Room, steam pipe to Drencher System, Exhaust Steam Pipe to Forward Oil Fuel Pump and the inner bottom over No.A6 O.F. Tank where  it finally came to rest.

9.     Damage to the hangar was confined to both Fire Curtains between “A” and “B” Hangars and the Forward Barrier Unit.


    The Flight Deck Fire Parties and Action Squadron Gangs were soon in action and were backed up by the Gallery Deck Fire Parties, who having found their areas clear came up to the Flight Deck with their hoses. All the small fires were soon extinguished and the large fire in the Avenger A/C was under control by 1200 and extinguished by 1210. Large sausage shaped sand bags were placed round the hole in the Flight Deck in an endeavour to prevent water and foam passing down into the Hangar. This was only partially successful and resulted in some aircraft in the Hangar being slightly damaged.

11    As soon as the fire was extinguished the order was given to clear the Flight Deck and fill in the hole. Sand and cement were ordered up to the Flight Deck and by 1315 the hole and deeper part of the depression were cemented over, M.S. plates were then placed on top of the cement and tack welded. By this time No. 1 Barrier had been rendered serviceable and at 1700 the ship was ready to operate aircraft although only one barrier was available and maximum speed was 24 knots. Essential repair work continued and by 0200/5thg May, Boiler Room repairs were completed and full speed available, the wrecked Fire Curtains had also been cleared from “A” Hangar.

12    The Foamites which had been brought up from below and placed in the access lobbies proved invaluable in dealing with the small fires. It is strongly urged that approval be given for an increased allowance as requested in my letter No. 6690/117 of 29th April 1945. A large number of these Foamites were refilled and used again, the refilling organisation worked well.


With reference to C.A.F.O. 2489/42, Section III, para 14, the following details are submitted:-
1   State of ship with regard to D.C. Parties. State I
    Watertight Doors. Z State
    Ventilation. Z State
    Fire Main. Isolated into 6 sections.
    Liquid in various tanks. N.A.

2 N.A.

3 N.A.

4 See narrative.

5 See narrative para 12. A considerable increase in the amount of Foam Compound carried is required. At the time of the incient 1000 gallons was onboard. It is considered that this should be increased to 2000 gallons.

6 N.A.

7 Satisfactory

8 See narrative. The importance of having large numbers of men available in this class of whip when Kamikaz attacks are likely cannot be overstressed.


1    Splinter from Flight Deck armour plate entered Centre Boiler Room through escape hatch (port side) crushed and split Auxiliary Superheated Steam Pipe to Drencher system, Pigsear drain pipe from P.A. Fan, drive to remote reading tachometer P.A. Fa, Auxiliary Exhaust Pipe from forward Oil Fuel Service pump and penetrated through to Inner Bottom into A.6 Oil Fuel Tank between the Oil fuel Service Pumps.

2   1. Machinery was in units and Starboard Unit was entirely unaffected.
     2. Port Unit. On being hit, two forward boiler room fans were put out of action as a result of access doors from hatches to Boiler Room opening and buckling due to distortion of clips from blast. On shutting Main Deck Hatches to the two forward fan downtakes both soon were able to operate normally up to half power. The two distorted access doors were removed, straightened and replaced, whereupon Full Power was available in Port Unit.
    3. Until the two Main Deck hatches were shut steam pressure was not allowed to fall below 300lbs./, thus ensuring adequate steam for nos. 2 and 6 dynamos and only slow speed ahead was available on the Port Engines.
    4. Centre Unit. Owing to escaping steam, boiler room had to be evacuated and steam ot oil fuel pump heaters and fans shut off from the emergency position.
    Nos. 3 and 4 dynamos were shut down and centre engine allowed to trail. Steam supply to centre engine room was changed over to starboard unit, whereupon starboard and centre engines were available for half power
    5. As the steam pressure dropped, attempts were made continually to enter the Centre Boiler Room and shut down both boilers. Four hours after the hit it was possible to survey the damage and repairs to the Exhaust Steam pipe were put in hand. Drencher steam isolated the Master valve. Auxiliary superheated steam was supplied by Starboard Boiler Room. Nos. 3 and 4. Dynamos were re-started and put back on load.
    After dark A.6 Oil fuel tank was pumped overboard and water bilge thoroughly washed through prior to flashing up the boilers. By 0200 on 5th May Centre Boilers were again connected and machinery fully in units.
    3. All machinery has been protected against shock and no damage from shock was experienced

C.A.F.O. 2489/42. Section V – Damage to Gun Armament and means taken to restore efficiency.

“B” H.A/L.A. Mk. IV Director.
1. Damage was caused by splinters and blast to:
a. The U.D.5 rangefinder.
b. The barrange change-over switch.
c. The elevating arrangements of the type 285 aerial
d. The plating of the cab.
Items a, b and d remained operative. The elevating drive of item c was renewed.

2-Pdr Mk. VIII Guns on Mk. VI A* R.P.50 Mountings
2. P.1 Pom-Pom
The barrel nut of No.5 gun was distorted by splinters. The nut was faired off by filing and will be replaced.
3. P.2 Pom-Pom    
The elevating and training receivers were damaged by blast and various taper pins were found to be sheared. These pins were renewed.
4. S.2 Pom-Pom
Blast has caused slight indentations of the training roller path. The mounting remains operational and the path and roller will be overhauled at the first opportunity.
5. 2-Pdr Generally
A number of blast eliminators and eyeshooting sights were damaged. The eliminators were removed and the sights were replaced.

Oerlikon Twin Mk V Mountings
6. No.8 Mounting.
A pressure pipe was damaged by splinters and was temporarily repaired by a length of rubber tubing, held by “Jubilee” clips.
7. No. 12 Mounting.
A sight arm carrying the Mk. XIV Gyro Gun Sight was damaged by blast. Pending the welding or renewal of the sight arm, immediate repairs were made to enable the eyeshooting sight to be used.
8. No. 14 Mounting.
Damage to the electrical leads at No. 1 mounting necessitated using the alternative hand arrangements until power was re-established.

Pom-Pom Director Mk. IV.
9. S.1 Director
The supporting arms and elevating rods for the G.R.U and sight were sheared by the blast. Replacements have been demanded.
10. S.3 Director
The calculating box casing and mechanism were damaged by splinters. The mechanism has not yet been examined in detail.
11. P.2 Director
The training sight arm carrying the binoculars was damaged and a replacement is required. The lateral rate calculating mechanism is damaged and detailed overhaul is being carried out.
Reference to Paragraph 8. Recommendations to increase efficiency.

2-Pdr Mountings.
It is recommended that where practicable splinter screens approximately 4’ wide by 6’ high be fitted to the mounting in rear of the layer.

A splinter shield should be fitted to the ship’s structure on the inboard side to screen personnel from splinter and blast when explosions occur on the Flight Deck.
S.2 Mounting.
A fixed splinter shield is recommended further to protect the mounting and crew from the Flight Deck side.

Section VI – Torpedo Armament

Section VII – Electrical
C.A.F.O. 2489/42 Para. 18 (a).
1)    Ring Main split Fre and Aft; one Dynamo from each Steaming Unit feeding each side (i.e. Nos 1, 3 and 6 starboard side and Nos. 2, 4 and 5 Port Side.)
2)    No effect of shock outside the Island Structure and Hangar.
3)    Considerable damage to miscellaneous electrical equipment in the Island Structure due to shock and splinters and in the Hagar due to shock and the collapse of the Fire Curtain Structure. Details are given in Appendix.
4)     Loss of Steam to Nos. 3 and 4 Dynamos at 1135 due to Damage in Centre Boiler Room.
5)    The Load prior to damage was 5500 amps, which is approximately the normal “Action” Load. This had dropped to 5000 amps. Immediately after damage had occurred and the four remaining dynamos took the load comfortably.
6)  1. Sea-going efficiency – No effect
     2. Gunnery efficiency – “B” Director retained control of “B” Group, but had to rely on verbal direction rather than electrical tell-tales. A.D.P. lost Direct Control of Port Oerlikons. One Twin Mk. V Oerlikon, otherwise serviceable, lost electrical power.
    3. Flying efficiency – Commander (Flying’s) direct communication with Flight Deck, D.L.C.O., A.C.R., and Hangar out of action.
    Flight Deck Lighting System out of action for Night Flying.
7)    Temporary Lighting supplied to “Key” positions in the Island by flexible circuits. Damaged cables temporarily jointed and/or re-run.
8)    None

C.A.F.O. 2489/42. Para. 18 (b).
    All gear except that directly damaged functioned correctly and there were no indirect effects on the electrical system.

Details of Electrical Gear damaged.

Part I – On Superstructure.
1) Port Daylight Signalling Lamp (Patt, 443) – Inner and Outer Glasses smashed.
2) Fore Steaming Light and fixed Manoeuvring Lights – Glasses smashed.
3) Port After 20” and 10” S.P’s – Splinter damage.
4) Port A.D.C’s Sight – shock resulted in moving part lifting and centre shaft distorted.
5) Port Lower V/F Lamp – smashed by blast or shock.
6) 1 J.B. Patt. 88 – securing lugs fractured
7) 1 J.B. Patt P.J. – securing bolts fractured; J.B undamaged.
8) 1 J.B. American Type, Patt unknown – ebonite bars holding connectors smashed; box undamaged.
9) A.D.R. Air Cooling Plant – Compressor Motor insulating low as result of immersion in water and foam.
10) Extensive splinter damage to miscellaneous circuits including :-
All outgoing wiring from Flight Deck Control Room to Flight Deck Lighting
Tellephones etc, to Commander (F’s) position
Port 10” and 20” S.P’s.
Power Supplies to Y.E. Beacon
Both H.P. Supplies to No. 3 (Twin Mk. V) Oerlikon.
Check Fire, Open Fire, Gun Ready, etc, circuits in “B” Director

Part II – In Hangar
1) Light Fittings shattered within 20 feet forward and aft of point of impact.
2) Damage to miscellaneous circuits (including L.P. circuits to Port Oerlikons) in way of collapsed Fire Curtain structure.
3) Fire Curtains between ‘A’ and ‘B’ Hangars; Motors complete with reduction gearing, 2 in number, damaged beyond repair; control circuit wiring defective requires renewal.
4) Fire Curtains between ‘B’ and ‘C’ Hangars; Control Circuit wiring defective requires partial renewal.

Part III – Boiler Room
1) Lighting in Port Boiler Room – 20 per cent wiring damaged.


A.     W/T AND WA/T.

1)     Broadcast Outfit ABA, Island Port Side “B” Deck, was demolished by direct hit from shrapnel. All Island Loudspeakers were put out of action by shrapnel, the lead being cut at the after end of the Island on “A” Deck.
    Leads to WA/T “D” Type Loudspeaker on the Port side of the Island amidships were cut by shrapnel.
    Power to the YE Beacon from alternator W/T lead was cut by shrapnel at Flight Deck amidships (Meteorological Office).
    A.D.R. Broadcast leads were out by shrapnel between the Bridge Mess, “A” Deck, and the Pilot’s and Observers’ Ready Room, Flight Deck.
    Broadcast Outfit Type 409, speech lines on side of the Island were cut by shrapnel. Cables to the Bridge control position severed inside the Captain’s Sea Cabin and fractured on the Flying Bridge. Two Loudspeakers on the Island were wrecked by blast and one on the Port side of the Flight Deck hit by shrapnel. Bridge control position, all control switches were wrecked by 0.0” bullet which entered diagonally.

2)    Aerial outfit APH – dipoles fractured and buckled by blast. Feeders splintered by shrapnel. Aerial Outfit ART on mainmast, J Match bent by blast, feeder splintered by shrapnel on “B” Deck, after end of Island.
    8 receiving aerials on the foremast – wire and supporting insulators broken by blast and shrapnel. No shackles parted.


1)    The majority of the damage to Radar equipment was caused by failure of aerials due to blast, splinters and “flash”. Some supply cables were cut by splinters, but the majority were repaired within a few hours. A 14 KW Alternator was made unserviceable by salt water from fire mains.

2)    Type 281B, Island “B” Deck Aft.
The aerial of this set, on the mainmast, was badly burned. Feeders, dipoles and matching strips were also cut by splinters. New dipolse were fitted and the wooden support arms scraped. The aerial was serviceable within 48 hours.
Several power supply cables were cut, and these were repaired temporarily by inserting new lengths.
Junction boxes, battle transmitters and other instruments on the plywood office bulkhead were blown off by concussion. It is considered that any item weighing more than 5lbs should be fixed to metal brackets welded through the lagging on to the steel bulkhead.
The Main Receiver panel broke away from its resilient deckhead mounts, but was undamaged.
The glass of one scuttle was shattered, but the deadlight prevented ingress.

3)    Types 276 FVI/91, 243, 253 Aerials, all on Mainmast
Aerials were slightly damaged by blast and splinters. 
Telcothene and similar feeder cables were completely burnt out by flash; the remainder wair Dockyard assistance.
Type 276 aerial has holes in the lantern and in the waveguide section, above the rotating joint. The set radiates, but power is reduced and side echoes increased.
There was no damage to the sets.

4)     Type 277 – Island “D” Deck Forward
Aerial AUK received two hits from splinters. One entered the Junction Box on the Port side, severed four cables (DC Heater and Magslip) and entered the sump. The splinter has not yet been located.
The other splinters punctured the waveguide 18” above the flare. It produced a hole 1” in diameter and is now lodged in the bottom of the guide.
The performance of the set is not noticeably affected.
The bullet proof office door blew off its rollers but saved the set and operators from the effect of blast. The resiliently mounted modulator rocked violently and broke a lead covered supply cable. These cables had been fitted too short to allow for any movement of the panel. It has already been recommended that supplies to resiliently mounted panels should be run in flexible cables. (Radar Routine Report No. 2, February, 1945, page 7, item 12).
The receiver required re-tuning after the damage to the wave guide although none of the adjustments appeared to have slipped.

5)    Type 79B – Island “C” Deck, abaft Admiral’s Bridge
This set was reported still serviceable after the incident, so operators were told to continue operating. 15 minutes later the welded flange which supports the 243 and TBS aerials above the 79 aerials, gave way. TBS and 243 aerials fell and fractured a wooden 79 support arm, breaking a dipole and fracturing the 243 pyrotenax cable.
Temporary repairs were made by stripping the mast, lashing the TBS aerial to the forward spar and replacing the 79 dipole and feeders. The 243 aerial awaits replacement.
The duplicate 14KW alternator fitted in the Ordinance Artificer’s Workshop was made completely unserviceable by salt water from fire hoses.

6)    Remote Displays and Communications
Most of the remote displays are out of action at present. A splinter cut the Pyrotenax Synch and Signal lines which run from the combined 381/267 Office along the port side of the Island to the instruments forward of the funnel.
It is considered that such cables should not be run in an exposed position, and that they should take at least two different routes.
In the event of damage to some lines, the remainder could then be used to feed all the remote displays by use of simple matching networks.
The Plot Compilation Group WA1 line from A.D.R., etc, to 281B was out, and was replaced.

7)    “B” Type 285
Splinters cut the main feeder, and flexible connectors, penetrated the beam switch, and destroyed the control panel on the remote bearing tube. The remote tube was replaced by a spare, and a four-way Junciton Box was substituted for the B/S. New connectors were installed, and the feeder replaced by a spare length, with J.B.
Reflector units on this set were holed by shrapnel. The damage was repaired by copper wire mesh placed behind the holes, following the curvature of the reflector.

8)     S1 Type 282
Blast broke the support arms of the reflector unit. No cables were damaged. Repairs await new G.R.U. and supports.

9)     S2 Type 282
Feeder cable cut in several places by splinters. Temporarily repaired by Styrex and Henley’s compound on damaged parts.

10)     General
All Radar sets with the exception of S2 Type 282 were operational within 84 hours of the incident

C.A.F.O. 2489/42     SECTION IX    - Anti Submarine Material

C.A.F..0. 2489/42    SECTION X    - AIR MATERIAL

1)    1.    A hole 2’ square was pierced in Flight Deck at junction of 3 armour plates at 79 Station, 9’ to Port of Centre line. Deck was depressed over area of about 24’ xy 20’ to a total depth of 2 feet. Deep beam under Flight Deck depressed about 1’3” at point of impact. This beam was distorted over a length of about 30 feet and badly buckled and torn at damage. The Hangar beams at 76 and 82 Stations were slightly depressed and distorted.
    2.     Arrester gear and Accelerator systems undamaged.
    3.    Forward Barrier Unit securing brackets distorted and outboard after securing bolt fractured. Main framing of Unit badly distorted. Rear let of Starboard forward stanchion distorted by splinter. After Barrier was made available for use by blanking off hydraulic pipes to forward barrier gear.
    4.     Damage to Flight Deck precluded operation of aircraft for five hours whilst No. 1 Barrier was being made serviceable and the hole in the Flight Deck was being temporarily repaired.

2)    Both lifts at Flight Deck level and deck deals closed. Both lifts undamaged.

3)    Forward and After armoured doors closed and were undamaged. All fire curtains were up with centre posts in position The inboard ends of both the curtains between ‘A’ and ‘B’ Hangars fell down and centre part was buckled and prevented from falling by adjacent Avenger aircraft. Fore and Aft movement of aircraft through Hangar was not possible. Ranging on to lifts could take place forward and aft.
Starboard Fire Curtain between ‘B’ and ‘C’ Hangars was damaged slightly by shock, the compensating spring for the roller being fractured.

4)    Hangar Sprayers and Fire Appliances not used. For Fire Curtains, see (3).

5)    Two valves on petrol drain systems, Port side of Flight Deck, fractured by splinters. Master valves on Main Deck were shut and there was no fire from this source.

6)    Some aircraft in the Hangar were bombed up but were not affected.

7)    Not applicable. A good deal of water cascaded down through the hole in the Flight Deck. Scuppers worked efficiently and the Hangar was never flooded.

8)    1.  One Corsair on outrigger S.1 forward of the island damaged by splinters, blast, and exploding ammunition. Beyond economical repair.
    2. One Corsair right forward on Flight Deck suffered minor damage.
    3. Eleven Avengers were being taxied forward in single line with wings folded at the time of attack. Of tehse 11 aircraft one was blown over the side, one was set on fire and became a total wreck and the remaining nine were severely damaged by splinters and blast. It was noted that the aircraft aft were more affected by blast, whilst the aircraft forward suffered damage mostly from splinter effects.
    4. One Avenger in ‘B’ Hangar was severely damaged by the fire curtain roller falling. Another aircraft received only very minor damage from the same cause.
    5. Damaged aircraft on deck were easily moveable and could be disposed as desired.

C.A.F.O. 2489/42    SECTION XI – Victualling